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ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INJURIES: RECONCILING THE BRA VE NEW 
WORLD OF PATIENT SAFETY AND THE TORTS SYSTEM 
EDWARD P. RICHARDS* AND THOMAS R. McLEAN** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The medical malpractice tort system is a failure. Judged on economic 
terms, more than fifty percent of the dollars are lost to transaction costs, and 
the instability of the market disrupts the orderly delivery of medical care. 
Judged on public-health terms, it not only fails to provide incentives for better 
medical care, but its irrationality actually impedes the adoption of better 
medical-care practices in several important situations. Most damning, judged 
on justice terms, it prov ides inadequate or non-existent compensation to most 
injured patients and undeserved win�falls to others, while forcing good doctors 
to subsidize the errors of incompetent physicians, who thus gain a market edge. 
Medical malpractice has been very good for the pocketbooks and political 
aspiration of lawyers, but it has failed the public and health-care providers 
alike. 
The magnitude of the failure of the tort system has been documented in a 
series of studies of substandard medical care, starting with the New York 
Study1 in the 1980s and culminating in the 1999 Institute of Medicine Study 
(the IOM study), To Err is Human,2 and the sequel, Crossing the Quality 
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1. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due 
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Practice Study Ill, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991). 
2. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
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Chasm.3 These studies claimed that each year as many as 98,000 Americans 
die and many more suffer significant injuries from medical mistakes, making 
malpractice one of the leading causes of death.4 The New York Study also 
echoed the finding of previous studies that most injured patients did not sue for 
medical malpractice, and among those who did, the severity of their injuries 
and not the scientific merits of their claim determined their compensation.5 
Implicitly recognizing the failure of the states to deal with patient safety, 
the federal government is moving forward with a national system for reviewing 
the quality of medical care and disciplining errant providers.6 While the 
authors believe that the fundamental motivation for this patients' system is to 
save money through controlling the delivery of medical care,7 nonetheless, it 
can be the core of an alternative to the torts system. This article explores an 
integrated quality credentialing and administrative compensation system for 
medical negligence. The authors argue that such a system must replace the tort 
system. Current efforts to impose federal quality standards while tinkering 
with concepts such as enterprise liability and no-fault compensation as 
adjuncts to the tort system will only perpetuate the injustice of the current 
system. 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE TORT SYSTEM 
It is important to take a hard look at the tort system and its role in medical 
care. There are many powerful interests that defend the tort system in general 
and the medical malpractice system in particular. 8 It both compensates p ersons 
injured through negligence and deters dangerous behaviors. At the same time, 
it is recognized that administrative law systems have several major flaws.9 
3. COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001). 
4. See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 2, at l .  
5 .  Localio. supra note I ,  a t  248-50. 
6: The term that best describes this evolving system is "Quality Credentialing." In the past, penalties have f�used on fraudulent acts by providers. Under the new system, whether the 
g�vemrnent or pnvate contractors reward or punish will tum on the number of errors or near 
misses that are identified in a physician's outcomes. See infra notes 107-38 and accompanying 
te:i\t. 
7 
· Patient safety is the public face of the effor t because it is much more politicall y  
acceptable than admitting tha� the federal government i s  setting up a national managed-care 
syste�
 t
.
o control 
.
the prov1s1on of medical care. See generally Thomas R. McLean, The 
Imp/1catwns of Patient Safety Research & Risk Managed Care, 26 s. ILL. u. L.J. 227 (2002). 
8. Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: The Complexity of Tort Reform, 12 LEGAL MED. 
PERSP. (2003), at http://www.aclm.org/publicationsflmp.asp. 
� . . See
.' 
e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986). 
Adnumstrauve law systems are antidemocratic in that d 
· · d . ec1S1ons are ma e by government employees rather than JUrors, and these decisions are very difficult to contest because courts give great deference to agency decision making Id at 363 A · · · . genc1es can make rules that have the 
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State boards of medical examiners are the administrative agencies currently 
charged with assuring the quality of medical practice, and, with few 
exceptions, they have wholly failed to address substandard medical care.10 Yet 
we believe that even an imperfect administrative compensation system will be 
an improvement over the existing medical malpractice system. 
A. Is There a Deep Pocket? 
The primary purpose of the tort system is to provide compensation for 
persons who are injured through the negligent or intentional actions of others 
who have a legal duty to avoid such injuries.11 There are two critical 
limitations on the tort system as a method of compensation. First, a tort-based 
compensation requires that the negligent party have adequate resources to pay 
the claim, either personally or through his own insurance. In many automobile 
accident cases, the negligent party does not have adequate insurance because 
the cost of a serious injury greatly exceeds the $10,000 to $20,000 maximum 
coverage provided by most automobile liability insurance policies.12 While the 
news media focuses on huge verdicts, the truth is that in many automobile 
accident cases the tort system cannot provide adequate compensation, or any 
compensation at all, because the defendant is inadequately insured or not 
insured. 
Similarly, malpractice coverage is often inadequate for compensating the 
most serious injuries. Medical malpractice coverage is generally purchased by 
a provider for the minimum limits mandated by statute or by the hospital at 
which the provider practices. For the most part, such policies are limited to 
$1,000,000 per incident and $3,000,000 total coverage per year.13 As 
force of law and use these rules to further limit the ability of regulated parties to contest agency 
actions in court. Id. at 380-83. A gencies are subject to bias, and it is much harder to disqualify a 
biased agency judge than a state or federal court judge. Most fundamentally, agencies are 
criticized because they violate our notions of separation of powers by having the same agency, 
and often the same people, act as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Id. 
I 0. In some cases this is because unorthodox practitioners have powerful friends in the 
legislature and get laws passed limiting the board's authority. See To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 
2, at 70-71; CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 3, at 24-25. 
11. Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort !Aw, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 585, 585 (2003). 
12. See Insurance Information Institute, Auto Insurance Expenditures by State, a t  
http://iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto (last visited Nov. 6, 2004). 
13. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GA0-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HA VE CONlRJBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 6 (2003) 
(Report to Congressional Requesters), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.ite ms/d03702.pdf 
(hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: REPORT]; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, PUB. NO. GA0-04-128T, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS 
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES (2003) (Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Wellness and Human Rights, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
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discussed in the following section on transaction costs, the plaintiff is unlikely 
to get more than $500,000 to $750,000 of a $1,000,0000 award. This has to 
cover both past medical bills, future lost earnings, and future medical care. 
Serious injuries that require long-term medical care will have future costs in 
the millions of dollars.14 In almost all cases, multi-million dollar awards come 
from institutional providers, usually hospitals.15 Average settlement payments 
by physicians in medical malpractice cases have increased from $232,000 to 
$324,000 between 1998 and 2002, and the instances of multi-million dollar 
payments by institutional providers has also increased.16 Relying on 
institutional providers to pay large claims further limits the cases where 
adequate compensation is available. Hospitals are usually not liable for the 
negligence of medical staff members.17 More fundamentally, the trend for 
years has been to move medical care out of the hospital and into the 
physician's office. 
The most important limitation on tort compensation is that it is  only 
available, even in a limited fashion, when there is negligent treatment and that 
negligence causes injury. While the initial IOM study claims up to 98,000 
deaths a year and many more injuries from substandard care, there are two 
important caveats in translating that into tort compensation. First, and most 
important, the IOM does not distinguish between the death of an otherwise 
healthy person who might have lived for many more years and the death of a 
critically ill patient who, in the absence of substandard care, might have lived 
only a few days. Second, the IOM's notion of substandard care is not 
necessarily the same as negligent care. Substandard care can be due to 
Representatives), available at http://www.gao.gov/new .items/d04 l 28t.pdf. [hereinafter MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: TESTIMONY]. 
14. There is one exception, in that Louisiana has an administrative compensation system for 
future medical costs that assures that the injured person i s  cared for. This is still a tort-based 
system, but once the court determines that the plaintiff is entitled to future medical care, the 
responsibility for that care is shifted to a state compensation board. There is no damage award, 
but the board pays for future care. This assures that care is available and reduces the transaction 
costs because the attorneys do not share in the money paid for future care. See generally Kelty v. 
Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1994). 
1 5. See Berkeley Rice, Hospitals Feel the Malpractice Pain, MED. ECON., Oct. 10, 2003, at 
37. 
16. Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Malpractice: Don't Wait For a Lawsuit to Strike, MED. ECON., 
March 22, 2003, at 83; Press Release, Physician Insurers Association of America, PIAA, NPDB 
Data Show Medical Malpractice Costs Still Rising; NPDB Puts Total Payout Increase at 8% 
(May 4, 2004), available at http://www.thepiaa.org/pdf_files/20040504. 
17. Most medical staff members are independent contractors and the hospital will only be 
liable for their negligence if the hospital itself was negligent in allowing the physician to join or 
remain on the medical staff, or if a hospital employee such as a nurse was also negligent. See, 
e.g., Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp. of Las Vegas, 910 P.2d 271, 274 (Nev. 1996); Candler Gen. 
Hosp., Inc. v. Persaud, 442 S.E.2d 775, 776-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1 994). See also BARRY R. FuRROW 
ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, ch. 6 (4th ed. 2001). 
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inadequate community resources, limitations on medical insurance coverage, 
and other factors that are failings of the health-care system, not health-care 
provider negligence. The vast majority of complications from medical 
treatment, even the most devastating complications, are the unpreventable 
c o nsequences of non-negligent treatments for serious diseases. 
There is no compensation for unavoidable complications other than the 
individual's own medical and disability insurance coverage, so-called "first 
person insurance." Because many people do not have this coverage, either 
because they cannot afford it or because they choose not to buy it, serious 
illness and treatment complications often result in financial ruin. This is a 
tragedy that is not addressed by the tort system. It is also one that subverts the 
tort system because juries are often swayed by the stories of severely injured 
persons who are in need, even when the scientific facts do not support their 
claim that the injuries were due to negligence. 
B. Transaction Costs 
The transaction costs of the tort system are the second reason for its 
failure. They consume most of the dollars paid for medical malpractice 
insurance, and they also make it economically impossible for the majority of 
persons injured through negligence to seek compensation through the tort 
system. There are three major transaction costs in tort-based medical 
negligence compensation: 
1) Contingent fees, expenses, and plaintiffs attorney opportunity costs; 
2) Defense lawyer's costs; and 
3) Costs of health-care provider's direct and indirect expenses. 
Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs have received the most media attention. 
Contingent fees can run up to fifty percent of the award if the case is appealed. 
Some states, such as California and Illinois, have capped contingent fees. 18 
Contingent fees are only part of the costs of case preparation. Case 
investigation often requires the work of many professionals other than the 
attorneys, and there are costs for copying records, traveling to talk to 
witnesses, and the single largest expense, paying physician expert witnesses. 
In most contingent fee contracts the plaintiff is responsible for the costs even if 
there is no recovery, although many attorneys waive the costs if there is no 
18. California caps contingent fees at forty percent of the first $50,000, thirty-three and one­
third percent of the next $50,000, twenty-five percent of the next $500,000, and fifteen percent of 
any amount that exceeds $600,000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6146 (West 2004). 
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recovery and the client is not well-off.19 These costs can run up to many 
thousands of dollars, sometimes as much as $50,000 to $100,000 in a complex 
case taken to trial. 
Because there is no direct recovery of attorney fees in tort cases in most 
states, the fees and costs must come from the plaintiffs proven damages, 
assuring that unless there is a large pain and suffering award, the plaintiffs 
actual recovery after all costs and fees will be a fraction of the real damages. 
The combination of costs and contingent fees-even in a state like California 
that caps fees-can consume most of the award. If there is an inadequate 
award, the attorney loses the value of the time spent preparing the case, so the 
potential recovery must be great enough to pay the costs, give the attorney a 
fair return on his time, and leave enough money to benefit the client. 
Defense costs receive much less public scrutiny but can equal or exceed 
plaintiffs' attorneys' costs because they are incurred in all cases, unlike 
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, which are only paid in cases where there is a 
settlement or a plaintiffs jury verdict. Defense costs include attorney time, 
almost always billed at an hourly rate, costs of case-related services such as 
copying and travel, and expert witness costs. Defense costs increase as the 
case gets closer to trial, with costs rising dramatically in the weeks before trial 
as attorneys prepare for and then participate in the trial. Early settlements or 
dismissals limit defense costs but also limit the revenue of the defense lawyers, 
creating potential conflicts. It is not unusual for defense costs to exceed 
$200,000 in cases litigated to a verdict, which means even a win for the 
defense is a significant loss to the medical malpractice insurer or to the 
corporate defendant paying its own attorneys. 
Health-care providers involved in medical malpractice litigation have 
significant direct and indirect costs that are not covered by medical malpractice 
insurance. Direct costs include lost time from practice while participating in 
the preparation and trial of the case, retaining a personal lawyer to oversee the 
case if there is a chance the verdict will exceed the insurance limits and ' 
potential loss of business due to adverse publicity. The emotional cost is also 
very high. For many physicians, the lawsuit becomes the single focus of their 
lives for years, disrupting all other aspects of their lives. Some even commit 
suicide.20 
19. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law . . . What Might Happen if Contingent Legal 
Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1998). This is an important issue because 
the majority of claims do not result in any payout. 
20. For an interesting look at the emotional cost of medical malpractice cases on both 
physicians and plai ntiffs, see SARA c. CHARLES & EUGENE KENNEDY, DEFENDANT: A 
PSYCHIATRIST ON TRIAL FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( 1986). 
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C. The Impact of Transaction Costs 
T ransaction costs for medical malpractice compensation impact the 
fairness of the system. Most plaintiffs who get a recovery receive fifty percent 
or less of the actual settlement or verdict. The recovery of non-economic 
damages-pain and suffering-is a response to the problem, allowing the jury 
to top off the award so that the plaintiff talces home closer to the real costs of 
compensation. This is not the case with settlements, however, which are 
usually at a discount to the patient's true compensation needs. For plaintiffs 
who get little or no recovery, the process of spending several years focused on 
the lawsuit, with considerable personal sacrifice in many cases, is embittering 
and only complicates their recovery. 
The second impact is that plaintiffs with smaller claims cannot afford 
representation. While the cutoff for an economically valid claim under the 
contingent fee system is, at best, an apocryphal number, conventional wisdom 
is that a claim must have provable damages of at least $100,000, and many 
specialist firms want damages in the $500,000 range.21 As with most types of 
injury data, the most severe injuries are only a small part of the total number of 
injuries. Data from the New York study showed that few cases of iatrogenic 
injuries lead to legal claims. 22 The most important determinant was the 
severity of the injury. 23 While the less severe injuries would support smaller 
awards, their frequency would make the total payouts much larger in a system 
. h II . 24 wit sma er transaction costs. 
Thus, there are two powerful incentives to maintain high transaction costs. 
First, the lawyers on both sides have little interest in any reform that would 
lower lawyer costs. Second, the medical malpractice insurers have no 
incentive to lower transaction costs in any way that would make it cheaper to 
bring a claim. As plaintiffs' lawyers rightly complain, all the efforts at tort 
reform are aimed at reducing the number of claims and reducing the potential 
awards for a given claim, not increasing the justice of the system for plaintiffs. 
D. Deterrence 
Defenders of the tort system argue that deterrence plays an important role 
in improving medical care. Tort law can deter activities that are not 
economically viable when their profits are offset by the internalization of the 
2 1 .  Ironically, while there is much discussion of frivolous claims, as if plaintiffs with minor 
problems are flooding the court system, Jaw finns seldom bring claims unless there are major 
injuries. The conflict is whether the injury was caused by the care and the appropriate standard of 
care. 
22. Localio, supra note l, at 247. 
23. Id. at 249. 
24. See generally Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical 
Summary 1 28 W. J. MED. 360 ( 1 978). 
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cost of the injuries they cause. Compensation through tort law serves to 
internalize the cost of injuries caused by an activity. More accurately, 
deterrence happens when the profits of an activity are offset by the 
combination of the cost of compensation and the transaction costs associated 
with claims for compensation. Sometimes deterrence is based on the cost of 
compensation paid out. More commonly, deterrence is really due to the 
actions of public regulators, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
or the Department of Transportation. While tort claims may bring problems to 
the attention of regulators, just as often, regulators bring problems to the 
attention of the tort bar. In some cases, the cost of defending unfounded 
claims can drive a safe drug from the market, as happened with Bendectin, a 
drug designed to manage severe nausea in pregnant women.25 Deterrence also 
acts through the fear of insurers. If insurers are concerned that an activity will 
attract litigation, they will refuse to insure it. 
Opponents of tort reform and alternatives to the tort system argue that 
deterrence is very important to encourage health-care providers to practice 
better medicine. The best, and perhaps only significant example was the use of 
litigation fears to hasten the adoption of monitoring standards for general 
anesthesia, in particular the use of oximetry and capnography.26 In this case 
the deterrence theory was that lawyers would convince courts that such 
monitoring was the standard of care and that anesthesiologists who did not use 
the monitors would be impossible to defend. This contributed to the rapid 
adoption of monitoring standards,27 with a dramatic reduction in medical 
malpractice claims against anesthesiologists and the lowering of their medical 
malpractice insurance rates. The interesting lesson from this was that there 
was no litigation over failure to use these devices at the time the standards 
were adopted. The tort lawyers were used as bogeymen to hasten the adoption 
of the new standards by the anesthesia professional organizations. 28 
This is an isolated example. The introduction of fetal monitoring for 
pregnant women led to the opposite result, a significant increase in legal 
claims.29 In some cases there have been changes in the behavior of medical 
25. Once Maligned Morning Sickness Drug Preparing for Comeback, Oct. 10, 2000, 
avai lable at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/women. For an example of one of the many 
lawsuits, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
26. STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (1987). See also Jay 
B. Brodsky, What Intraoperative Monitoring Makes Sense?, 115 CHEST lO l S, 102S (1999). 
27. HARVARD MED ICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990). 
28. This was orchestrated through the Anesthesia Safety Counsel, a group of experts 
including Professor Richards, which was funded by the major manufacturer of oximeters. The 
manufacturer wanted to improve patient safety but also wanted to sell its machines. It was very 
successful at both efforts. 
29. See generally Edward P. Richards & Charles Walter, How Effective Safet y Devices Lead 
to Secondary litigation, 10 IEEE ENG'G IN MED . & BIOLOGY 66 (1991). 
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care providers but no evidence that this has· improved the quality of medical 
care. The best example may be the extensive paperwork that physicians must 
complete to apply for state licensure or medical staff privileges. This usually 
includes references from every position that the physician held since medical 
school, and it is repeated by every institution that the physician deals with. 
While it may have eliminated a few impostors, there is no evidence that it has 
improved the quality of medical care. It has just increased the cost of care. 
More generally, the dark side of deterrence is defensive medicine. 
Defensive medicine is the ordering of diagnostic tests and the hospitalization 
of patients because the physician fears that failing do so will lead to litigation 
if the patient's course is not as predicted. What physicians fear is that they will 
be second-guessed for failing to make the correct diagnosis and that ordering 
extra tests or putting the patient in the hospital will show that they did 
everything possible.30 There is little support for the effectiveness of defensive 
medicine, but many physicians are convinced that they must do it.31 
E. Why Does Deterrence Fail? 
Deterrence fails for three reasons. First, the timeframe is wrong. Medical 
malpractice claims are paid years after negligent actions, making it very 
difficult for physicians to make the link between their behavior and the payout. 
More important, if the unsafe behavior is one that increases the profits of the 
physician, the hospital, or the managed-care plan, changing the behavior today 
costs real dollars, while the cost of potential claims in the future is only a 
theoretical risk: The discount rate of future claims to net present day value is 
very high. This behavior is economically rational because in many cases the 
potential profits from the practice patterns that create the litigation risk are 
higher than the incremental tort risk. 
Second, medical malpractice insurance provides very little incentive to 
change individual behavior. Most malpractice insurance is not individually 
rated. All of the physicians practicing the specialty in a given community pay 
30. Defensive medicine causes injuries, but a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article. See generally Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ER/SA Preemption for State Law 
Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. l (2001); Edward P. Richards & 
Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends 
in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443 (1997). See also Richard Hayward, 
VOMIT (Victims of Modern Imaging Technology)-An Acronym for Our Times, 326 BRIT. MED. 
J. 1273 (2003), available at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/contentlfull. 
31. Because someone will be paid for doing those tests or for time the patient spends in the 
hospital, there are other incentives for institutions to encourage this belief in the necessity of 
defensive medicine. One never hears of physicians saying that they have to spend more time 
talking to patients to prevent litigation, although this is perhaps the single most important way to 
reduce claims. 
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the same rate and share the losses. In a classic "commons" problem, there is 
little personal incentive for a physician to change his behavior.32 In fact, 
because physicians usually do not pay based on the volume of their work, there 
is an incentive to do as many risky but profitable procedures as possible 
because that increases the income for the same malpractice insurance 
payment.33 Thus all neurosurgeons pay very high malpractice insurance rates 
because some of them do a lot of unnecessary back surgery, which results in 
malpractice claims. Surgeons who do not do unnecessary procedures subsidize 
the medical malpractice insurance for surgeons who do. 
The third reason deterrence fails is the large number of medically 
unfounded claims that are brought and settled, or in which plaintiffs get a jury 
verdict. As discussed previously, in the analysis of transaction costs, 
plaintiffs' attorneys have powerful financial incentives to not bring medical 
malpractice cases unless the patient has major injuries.34 However, if the client 
has a major injury with long-term consequences, a skillful attorney can 
persuade a jury to overlook technical issues such as whether the physician 
followed the standard of care or whether the injuries were caused by the 
physician's actions at all. 
This is a critical point: The legal notion of a frivolous claim is profoundly 
different from what physicians think of as a frivolous claim. In the legal 
world, any claim you can win without violating the code of professional 
conduct is a valid claim, and you are obliged to bring it on behalf of your 
client-if you undertake the client's representation. 35 This is the source of 
much cognitive dissonance in the medical legal world. 36 
The breast-implant litigation is a typical example. By all scientific criteria, 
the litigation was unfounded and frivolous.37 By professional legal criteria it 
32. There is some adjustment based on which invasive procedures are performed; for 
example, family practitioners who deliver babies will pay a much higher rate than those who do 
not. 
33. One of the interesting provisions of the Virginia birth injuries compensation program 
discussed herein is that it is paid for by a per birth charge. While not discussed in the legislative 
analysis noted in the article, this might explain why many physicians do not participate; large 
volume practices might find conventional insurance, which is not rated by the number of births, 
cheaper, even through their risk is much higher. 
34. See supra text accompanying notes 2�24. 
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 ("Meritorious Claims and Contentions"); see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l. l 6 (discussing declining or 
terminating representation). 
36. This is why the current tort reform proposal to bar claims by attorneys who have filed 
three frivolous claims is unworkable. The legal system already has sanctions for attorneys who 
file frivolous claims. FED. R. Crv. P. l l. Adding new sanctions does not address the problem that 
it is not unethical to bring a claim you can win, even if the science is against you. 
37. See Gina Kolata, Panel Confirms No Major Illness Tied to Implants, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 1999, at A I. The final settlement exceeded 4 billion dollars. Id. 
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was perfectly ethical. None of the expert testimony used by the plaintiffs was 
credible in the scientific world, but because judges are allowed to use their 
own version of science in admitting testimony, these cases were allowed to go 
to trial and sympathetic juries awarded millions of dollars.38 As long as the 
duty of an advocate is to find an expert to support his client's case, not to find 
an impartial expert, medical malpractice law will send a hopelessly muddled 
deterrence signal. 39 Thus, claims are settled for various reasons, including the 
difficulty in explaining to the jury that the physician's wrongful act did not 
cause the plaintiff's injury; because the defendant has a difficult personality 
that the jury will dislike; or because juries typically rule for children whom 
they see as deserving, or any combination of reasons. All of these are perfectly 
acceptable legal reasons to bring a claim. All lead to the payment of medically 
unfounded claims.40 The aggregate effect of these false positive and false 
negative signals from the medical malpractice system is to convince physicians 
that medical malpractice claims are random events.41 Secondarily, paying 
verdicts and settlements that are based on medically unsound practices or 
scientifically unsupported claims sends a message to health-care providers and 
the public that such practices are acceptable. Important examples are 
unfounded claims that childhood vaccines cause injuries such as autism. 
While there is no evidence to support such claims, the massive media attention 
to such claims and their pervasive presence on websites supported by 
plaintiffs' attorneys has even convinced some health-care providers that 
vaccinations are dangerous and should be avoided.42 Thus, rather than a 
38. See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox 
of Expertise and Interdi sciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 715--16 
(2000). While Daubert is seen by many as reducing the a dmission of bad science, this is not 
necessarily the case. See id. The only cases that are seen on appeal are those where evidence has 
been excluded, i.e., where Daubert works. If the evidence is admitted, it is much more difficult to 
appeal the case, creating a profound selection bias against seeing cases where Daubert fails. 
3 9. Judges bear most responsibility here. Most state codes and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow judges to appoint special masters, neutral experts on technical matters, but 
judges almost never do this. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53. This would be a powerful check on the duty 
of zealous advocacy. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
40. It is important to note that plaintiffs also suffer under this system. Plaintiffs who are 
unsympathetic to a jury are at a disadvantage. Defense attorneys are subject to the same ethical 
rules as plaintiffs' attorneys and also use scientifically unfounded evidence to support their cases. 
41. See William Meadow et al., Physicians' Experience with Allegations of Medical 
Malpractice in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, PEDIATRICS, May 1997, at I. Moreover, it must 
be recognized that what limited data is available on medical malpractice claims is suboptimal 
because of selection bias of the reporting sources. 
42. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting 
Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 353 (2004). 
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deterrent, the tort system often encourages the worst sort of anecdotal claims 
d d. l 
. 43 
and runs contrary to all principles of scientifically base me 1ca practice. 
The example of oximetry to reduce anesthesia injuries and negligence 
claims against anesthesiologists, compared to efforts to reduce obstetric 
medical malpractice claims, illustrates a key point in this error signal theory of 
deterrence failure. As the anesthesiologist who was one of the developers of 
pulse oximetry explained it, oximetry is so simple even a surgeon can 
understand it. What he meant was that most anesthesia accidents, of whatever 
cause, had the common effect of injuring the patient through reducing the 
oxygen in the patient's blood. The oximeter of those days was a simple device 
that measured oxygen in the patient's blood in real time and beeped when it 
was too low. Everyone in the operating room could hear the beep, including 
the surgeon, who would know what it meant and could then make sure that the 
anesthesiologist checked on the patient.44 This was a simple, relatively 
inexpensive technological fix that promised to reduce claims by reducing 
injuries and, conversely, to increase claims if it was not used because it would 
be so easy for the plaintiffs attorney to claim it was negligent to not use it. 
In contrast, there is no easily detected common cause of birth injuries, 
which are the biggest cause of obstetric claims. Scientific evidence shows that 
many birth injuries that result in huge jury awards are not due to the 
obstetrician's negligence at all but are the result of chronic conditions of the 
placenta or other unpreventable events.45 There is no simple solution to birth 
injuries that obstetricians can be frightened into using through fears of 
litigation. This is much more typical of medical negligence than the simple 
technical fix of oximetry. 
Ironically, there is a way to reduce birth injury claims, but because it does 
not address any single simple problem, the tort system does not provide a clear 
signal to use it. Advanced Medical Systems has developed a structured system 
of patient records and patient information materials to deliver prenatal care.46 
It assures that all necessary prenatal tests and examinations are conducted, and, 
as importantly, documents this in a clear and unambiguous record.47 The result 
43. Some states have attempted to limit these unfounded claims by using medical review 
panels. To the author's knowledge, none of these laws make the panel's finding binding, i.e., the 
plaintiff is not allowed to bring an unfounded claim or the defen dant cannot defend a valid claim. 
They do encourage the settlement of claims that the panel finds meritorious. This creates a 
selection bias in the cases that are tried, making it look like the panels are biased against plaintiffs 
because the only cases seen on appeal are ones in which the plaintiff lost at the panel. 
44. This was important because a major source of anesthesia injuries was anesthesiologists 
who were inattentive or even out of the room. 
45. Patricia King Urbanski, Placental Evaluation: Pregnancy's Black Box?, A WHONN 
LIFELINES, April 1997, at 54-55. 
46. ADVANCED MED. SYS. , INC., PRENATAL CARE-A SYSTEMS APPROACH, at 
http://www.amsintl.com (Last visited Nov. 8, 2004). 
47. Id. 
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is that even if there is a birth injury, it is very difficult to show any negligence 
because it is easy to show the jury that everything was done correctly and that 
the patient was properly informed at all times. Physicians using this system 
have claims at the rate of about 1/100,000 deliveries, dramatically lower than 
those who do not use the system.48 The lack of attention to this and other 
structured approaches to prenatal care, in the face of huge problems with 
obstetric medical malpractice claims, is perhaps the best evidence of the failure 
of deterrence. 
F. The Medical Malpractice Insurance Business 
The medical malpractice insurance system causes problems far beyond its 
contribution to the costs of health care. While reliable numbers are difficult to 
come by, the total cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums has never 
exceeded one to two percent of the total medical care budget.49 Even the most 
inflated estimates of defensive medicine do not raise the total to more than five 
percent of the medical care budget.so Yet physicians claim they are leaving 
practice because of insurance costs, and others claim to be leaving states such 
as Mississippi because of insurance cost and availability.s1 How can such a 
small part of the health-care budget have such a disproportionate effect on 
physicians?s2 
The cost of medical malpractice insurance is not evenly distributed across 
the participants in the health-care delivery system. Under recent United States 
Supreme Court case law,s3 medical care insurers, through which most of the 
private money in health care flows, have almost complete immunity from 
medical malpractice claims.54 Conversely, physician practices, which account 
48. Id. 
49. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No GA0-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 26-29 (2003). 
50. See generally id. 
5 1 .  Id. 30-36; see a lso FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, THE IMPACT OF 
STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF 
PHYSICIANS (2003) (prepared for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)), at 
http://www.ahrq .gov/research/tortcaps. 
52.  In part, the disproportionate effect on Medical Doctors is related to two decades of 
managed care and Medicare cuts that has made the profit margins of some physicians razor thin. 
See Thomas R. McLean, Using the Market to Regulate Health Care Price: Why Heart Hospitals 
Will Have a Competitive Advantage in the World of Post-Diagnostic Related Group Pricing, 2 
AM. HEART HOSP. J. 1 65, 1 65 (2004). 
53.  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004). This freedom from liability is 
in part related to the complex nature of this case and the complex functions (medical oversight 
and risk dispersion) that the HMO had taken on. 
54. Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, The "Aetna Health " Ruling, NAT' L L.J., 
Aug. 30, 2004, at 1 2; Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care 's " Thirty Years 
War": The Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 3 1 6-
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for only about twenty-five percent of the health-care budget, bear most of the 
costs of the medical malpractice system.55 Among physicians, rates are set 
state-by-state and are based on specialty practice, certain procedures,  and 
geographic areas.56 As the number of physicians in a rating group decreases, 
the averaging effect decreases, increasing the volatility of the rates.57 The 
level and quality of the state's  insurance commission affects the volatility of 
the rates, as do issues such as the accuracy of risk estimation by the insurer, the 
rate of return on money invested by the insurer to cover future claims, the cost 
of reinsurance, and the actual claims paid out on the groups of physicians. 58 
Rates are also affected by state tort law practices and tort reform laws, 
although GAO studies do not demonstrate any consistent pattern for the effect 
of the reforms.59 While most physician groups point to California' s tort reform 
package as having stabilized rates in that state, it is impossible to sort out the 
influence of other factors, especially the size of the state and the huge 
physician base over which the claims can be averaged.60 
Rates alone are only part of the problem. The most acute problem is 
availability of insurance. Major medical malpractice insurance carriers have a 
pattern of leaving states when the insurance cycle turns down, reducing the 
profitability of their product.61 This was less of an issue in the 1 970s, when 
most coverage was written as occurrence policies, i.e.,  if you were insured in 
1 975 and a claim was made against you in 1 979, it was paid for by your 1 975 
policy. 62 This created a long tail on claims because the insurer had to predict 
the cost of covering claims in the future, making it difficult to set rates.63 One 
of the responses to the 1970s medical malpractice insurance rate crises was to 
change coverage to claims-made policies.64 Claims-made insurance only pays 
claims that are brought within the effect date of the policy.65 Thus, you have to 
keep buying insurance, even if you are no longer in practice or even alive. If 
17 (2004). This remains true despite the reality that many practices that lead to patient injuries 
are the result of managed care financial policies. 
55. The usual structure of hospital staffs keep the physicians as independent contractors, so 
the hospitals are only liable for the small group of employed physicians, for the actions of their 
staff that are done at the direction of a physician, and for failing to properly credential medical 
staff members. 
56. See MEDI CAL M ALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 13.  
57. Id.; see also HELLINGER & ENCINOSA, supra note 5 1 .  
58. See MEDICAL M ALPRACTICE INSURANCE: REPORT, supra note 13 .  
59.  See generally id. 
60. There are also informal reports that the claims frequency is rising in California, which 
may destabilize the rates in the long term. 
6 1 .  MEDI CAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: REPORT, supra note 13 ,  at 37-38. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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you stay with the same insurer for all of your practice years, you only notice 
the difference between claims made and occurrence insurance when you leave 
practice or change states .  At that point you have to buy tail coverage, an 
additional policy that covers any claims made for care rendered during your 
primary policy coverage. Depending on the company' s policy, the cost of tail 
coverage can be inexpensive or can cost several times a single year's premium. 
The problem is that tail coverage costs are not regulated effectively in 
many states, so that if an insurer leaves the state, its policyholders will have to 
buy tail coverage as a high and unexpected expense. The alternative is to pay a 
surcharge to the successor insurer66 so that the new insurer will cover claims 
based on care rendered under the previous policy. As with the tail coverage, 
this surcharge comes as a large and unexpected expense. In the worst c ase, 
there will not be any insurers in the state willing to write coverage, leaving the 
physician bare and unable to continue practice since most hospitals require 
insurance for hospital medical staff privileges. 
Thus, the medical malpractice insurance system has two major flaws. 
First, even when it is working well and the rates are stable and reasonably 
related to physician ' s  income, it provides little incentive for individual 
physicians to practice risk management.67 While private insurers will refuse to 
write coverage for physicians with a lot of losses, that is a sufficiently remote 
threat that has little impact on the day-to-day practice of the insured.68 Second, 
over the long run, it has proven to be unstable because of the insurance cycle. 
This leaves physicians facing unexpected rate increases or surcharges and even 
leaves them with the threat of no coverage. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TORT SYSTEM 
Physicians and hospitals are the major proponents of tort reform, so it is 
not surprising that most tort reform efforts attempt to affect the insurance side 
of the problem by limiting the potential awards, by using screening panel s  to 
reduce the cost of dismissing scientifically unfounded cases, and by limiting 
66. This is commonly known as nose coverage. 
67. There are some exceptions. The COPIC Insurance Company in Colorado, which was 
formed by physicians in Colorado in response to the uncertainty of the insurance market in the 
state, developed risk management standards in several important areas and required their insured 
to follow the standards. See Copiscope Newsletter, available at http://callcopic.com/publications/ 
copiscope.htm (COPIC's risk management newsletter, published bi-monthly). 
68. Many states have state-managed alternatives to private medical insurance for physicians 
who cannot get coverage in the private market, thus removing even the threat of non-coverage. In 
Louisiana, for example, the state fund is limited to charging a small surcharge for physicians with 
a bad claims history, making it difficult to remove such physicians from the insurance system. 
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 299.44 (West 2001) .  
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the time to bring the cases.69 There are three other major alternatives that have 
been proposed by researchers and by business groups. While none of these �as 
gained much support, it is  important to understand why they are not effective 
alternatives to administrative compensation. 
A. Binding Arbitration 
Binding arbitration is used extensively to control litigation costs in other 
industries. While some states putatively ban arbitration agreements for medical 
malpractice cases, such bans have been rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court as preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.70 Arbitration can limit 
unfounded claims and scientifically implausible claims and can eliminate 
outlier jury awards. Arbitration can reduce the transaction costs, but only if 
plaintiffs' attorneys adjust their fee agreements and defense attorneys do not 
prepare the cases as if they were going to trial. Some health-care providers 
have used arbitration to reduce the cost of managing negligent injuries.7 1  
The biggest hurdles to binding arbitration are physician fears, which are 
encouraged by defense attorneys who are skeptical of binding arbitration. 
Physicians are frightened of arbitration because it is seen as always trying to 
give something to both sides. The almost uniform adoption of arbitration by 
securities dealers seems to indicate that this is not a significant monetary 
problem, but the requirement that malpractice settlements be reported to the 
National Practitioner Database makes physicians unwilling to accept a system 
that is seen as more likely to give an award.72 Insurers are ambivalent about 
arbitration because of data that shows that reducing the transaction costs will 
increase overall payments. Because their interest is in controlling overall 
payments, not in assuring fair compensation, cost-effective arbitration would 
be a threat to their bottom line. Arbitration might improve the deterrence 
signal if it reduced awards without scientific merit, but because it has not been 
used extensively in medical malpractice cases, there is not empirical support 
for its effect on deterrence. 
69. Caps on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees do shift a bit more money to the injured person, but at 
the potential cost of further limiting the claims that can be economically litigated. 
70. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see also Doctor' s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 1 7  U.S. 68 1 ,  686-
87 (1 996) (preempting Montana state statute); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 480, 490-491 ( 1 987) 
(preempting California labor law); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 16-17 ( 1 984) 
(preempting California state statute). 
7 1 .  Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 7 1  (Cal. 1999). 
72. Joseph T. Hallinan, Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases is Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J. ,  
Aug'. 
27, 2004, at
. 
Al.  Be�ause there is no evidence that the National Practitioner Databank really 
proVIdes useful mformat1on about claims payments, its benefits may be outweighed by the 
adverse effect on more efficient claims settlement procedures.  Id. 
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B. Enterprise Liability 
Enterprise liability is the liability of businesses and other organizations for 
the negligent acts of their employees. It is a well-established concept that is 
very important in other areas of tort law. Outside of health care, torts against 
businesses almost always involve enterprise liability through the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, under which the employer is responsible for the negligent 
acts of the employee or agent when those actions are within the course and 
scope of employment or further the interests of the enterprise. 73 Enterprise 
liability greatly increases the chance that there will be enough money to pay a 
claim. It also provides a corporate defendant that is usually less sympathetic to 
the juror than the individual plaintiff. Enterprise liability does enhance 
deterrence for claims that the company can cheaply control by controlling its 
work force. In most cases this means screening out workers who pose a risk, 
such as those who have been convicted of crimes. It also encourages 
businesses to assure that employees obey laws such as those against drunk 
driving on company time. 74 Enterprise liability only addresses the transaction 
costs in the tort system if it is coupled with modifications in the standards for 
proving liability. For example, most states have reduced the burden of proving 
a case against the manufacturer of a product.75 This was done as a form of 
enterprise liability, in that the enterprise was the manufacturing sector.76 The 
rationale was that making tort cases for defective products easier to prove 
would reduce the cost of the cases for plaintiffs, shifting the cost of injury to 
manufacturer.77 If there were significant savings in the products liability 
system, few were passed on to the plaintiffs. More generally, enterprise 
liability does not affect the portion of tort costs going to injured persons and 
exemplifies the disconnect between awards and the standard of care of the 
underlying medical care. 
Traditional enterprise liability is very limited in health care. The major 
institutions in health care are hospitals and nursing homes, but in most cases 
they do not employ the physicians who practice there. Historically, state laws 
against the corporate practice of medicine prevented physicians from working 
73.  WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 47-80 (5th ed. 2003). 
74. See EEOC v. Exxon Corp. , 203 F.3d 87 1,  872 (5th Cir. 2000). The Exxon Valdez case 
may be the largest award against a company for a simple negligent act, although it is not clear that 
the Americans with Disabilities Act would have allowed Exxon to have disciplined the captain to 
prevent the accident. 
75. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL. , PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1 0 1 -
20, 147-269 (2d ed. 2002). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. Reducing the standard of proof in products injury cases had the unintended 
consequence of encouraging unfounded claims, such as those against the breast implant and 
vaccine manufacturers. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
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for hospitals and other lay-run medical businesses. Instead, they are treated as 
independent contractors. A hospital is only liable for negligence of a medical 
staff member when the hospital was itself negligent in admitting the physician 
to the medical staff, allowing the physician to remain on the medical staff, or 
when an actual hospital employee is negligent.78 If the physician works for a 
group practice or a managed-care company, that employer is liable.79 
Paul C. Weiler and Kenneth S. Abraham proposed a system of vicarious 
liability in which hospitals, the major enterprise in the medical system, would 
be responsible for iatrogenic adverse events. 80 This would require fundamental 
changes in the legal relationship between hospitals and physicians. It makes 
some economic sense in that the hospitals account for a larger share of health 
spending and thus could better bear the cost of the malpractice insurance. 
However, it ignores the trend to move care out of hospitals and into 
ambulatory care centers, which has accelerated since the paper was written. 
Even the notion of hospitals has changed with the advent of specialty care 
hospitals,81 which avoid the community care obligations of traditional 
h ospitals.82 An alternative system, which is at the root of the no-fault 
proposals, is to treat the entire health-care system as the enterprise and thus 
spread the cost of compensation over the industry. If this were done as a 
general tax on health care it would address the problem of the availability of 
medical malpractice insurance but not the other problems with a tort based 
compensation system. 
Some of the researchers who did the IOM Study argue that increasing 
enterprise liability83 will increase the deterrence effect of tort law and cause 
these institutions to discipline physicians to reduce patient injuries. This 
presupposes that there is a deterrence effect from tort law and that this effect 
would be more powerful for institutions. The major reasons that physicians do 
not feel a deterrence effect-the wrong time frame and mixed signals-are, if 
anything, more significant for institutions. Major businesses of all kinds, 
78.  Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 21 1 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (Ill. 1965). 
79. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1 1 37, 
1 1 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1 997). 
80. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution 
of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 38 1 ,  393-94 ( 1994). 
8 1 .  These specialty hospitals, which are often owned by the same physicians who operate i n  
them, may end up under enterprise liability because of the identity between control and medical 
practice. 
82. Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery: Innovation or a Means to Close Community 
Hospitals and Displace Physicians, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 495, 497 (2002). 
Not ?nly are hosp
.
itals going to become few in years to come but with the rise of specialty 
hospitals, the hospllal system is atomizing. Thomas R. McLean, The Rise of the Heart Hospital 
and the Fall of the House of Usher, 1 AM. HEART HOSP. J. 223, 223 (2003). 
83. This would be done both through forcing physicians to work for large health-care 
businesses and by limiting the independent contractor defense for hospitals. 
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including health-care institutions, do their financial planning on short time 
frames. There is pressure to show profits each quarter, and a year is a very 
long time in a rapidly changing business such as health care. Because payouts 
on medical malpractice claims happen years after the incident and there is no 
direct link between risk management efforts and insurance rates, health-care 
enterprises put a high net present-day discount on any efforts to prevent future 
medical malpractice claims. If the physicians who are putting the institution at 
risk are also generating significant billing for the hospital, any long-term 
savings will be more than offset by short-term losses. Unlike dealing with the 
driving habits of low-level employees, disciplining high-risk but high-grossing 
physicians has real short-term costs that make it unlikely that enterprises will 
be any more susceptible to deterrence than individual physicians. If the 
institution is under significant financial pressure, which is the case for many 
health-care institutions, all concerns about long-term risks tend to be subsumed 
by the pressure to keep the doors open day-to-day. 
C. No-Fault Compensation 
The third alternative to tort compensation is no-fault compensation (NFC) 
for medical malpractice injuries. This is the major focus of several research 
groups and has been proposed since the early 1970s. 84 No-fault compensation 
is in the workers' compensation system for workplace injuries, and several 
states have used limited no-fault compensation for automobile accidents.85 
The federal compensation systems for railroad workers,86 longshore and harbor 
workers,87 and seamen88 use a modified no-fault system that depends on 
showing a very small amount of fault. None of the proposed systems for no­
fault coverage for medical malpractice injuries effectively address the 
fundamental difference between medical practice and the areas where no-fault 
has been used. In medicine, most patients have something wrong with them 
when they seek treatment, something that under the best of circumstances may 
not get better. In contrast, an automobile accident no-fault system, or a 
worker' s compensation system generally deals with injuries that are clearly 
attributable to the accident. While both of these systems have to deal with 
injuries to persons who had pre-existing problems similar to those attributed to 
the accident, they represent a small fraction of the claims. 
84. Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity lnsurance "-A No-
Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51  MILBANK Q. 125, 128 ( 1973). 
85. There are various opt-out provisions for serious injuries and pre-existing injuries. 
86. 45 u.s.c. § 5 1  (2000). 
87. 33 u.s.c. §§ 901-06 (2000). 
88.  46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000). 
r 
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Medical injuries cannot be separated from unpreventable complications 
without a finding of fault and causation.89 The maj ority of medical malpractice 
claims involve injuries that might be the natural consequence of the disease or 
an unpreventable complication of the treatment. In many cases there may be 
questionable treatment, but it has nothing to do with the injury, i.e., there is no 
causation. Causation is only an issue in other no-fault systems when the 
patient has a pre-existing illness that resembles the claimed injury. Yet even 
establishing causation is not enough.90 If the question is just whether the 
treatment caused the inj ury, then every patient who suffered a complication of 
treatment would be eligible for compensation. Under such a system, a 
significant fraction of all patients would be entitled to compensation. To avoid 
having all complications become compensable, a medical compensation 
system must include a finding of improper adherence to medical standards, i.e., 
fault. 
Advocates of current no-fault compensation systems assert that no-fault 
coverage uniquely provides financial incentives to eliminate adverse medical 
events.91 This seems unlikely. If the current system, which focuses on 
physicians, does not provide workable incentives to reduce injuries and thus 
claims, spreading the risk over an even larger group would seem to further 
undermine the incentive. 
The major values of a workable no-fault coverage system would be 
increased fairness to injured patients and the spreading of costs over the entire 
health-care system.92 Such a plan will not necessarily be less expensive.93 
Because no-fault coverage would theoretically eliminate the need to prove 
negligence, it would facilitate the filing of smaller dollar-value cases. Not 
89. For an excellent critique of the no-fault proposal from the Harvard Study, which is the 
genesis of the IOM proposal, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Saying "No" to No-Fault: What the 
Harvard Malpractice Study Means for Medical Malpractice Reform, Address Before the Special 
Committee on Medical Malpractice, New York State Bar Association (Jan. 199 1 ). 
90. The best analogy is workers' compensation coverage for diseases with an occupational 
component, such as stress-related heart disease. While states have taken different approaches to 
determining compensation for such diseases, all of them depend on some type of analysis that 
moves away from simple no-fault to an evaluation of the contribution of the workplace conditions 
to the patient's overall health. 
9 1 .  David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, 
Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. 
L. REV. 1643, 1675 (2000); David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a "No-Fault " 
System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 ,  25-29 ( 1 997); 
David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The 
Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 221 (2001) .  
92. McLean, supra note 8 .  
93. See generally Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidenc e of A dverse Events and Negligenc e  in 
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Prac tice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
370 ( 1 99 1)  (recognizing various costs associated with negligence in hospitalized patients). 
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surprisingly, even the advocates of no-fault coverage are having difficulty 
demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of medical no-fault coverage.94 
There are two no-fault plans for primary medical malpractice injuries in 
the United States. Both deal with birth injuries, an area where lovable 
plaintiffs with long-term injuries increase the chance that juries will make huge 
awards, even in the absence of clear medical negligence. Both are 
administrative compensation systems modeled after workers' compensation 
systems. The Virginia plan uses a workers' compensation model and has the 
workers' compensation board make the determination of whether a baby meets 
the criteria for compensation under the plan.95 The Virginia plan is voluntary 
for physicians and hospitals, with only about seventy-five percent of the babies 
born in the state covered by the plan.96 If the physician or hospital participates 
in the plan, it pre-empts any tort claims for the covered injuries.97 If the baby 
qualifies under the plan, h e  or she can receive all necessary care, which often 
exceeds the total value of awards under the capped Virginia tort system before 
the attorney's fees and insurance subrogations are deducted from the tort 
awards.98 The plan seems to be much more fair than the tort system in that 
most of the award goes to the plaintiff and because there is no cap on the 
necessary care. Not all physicians participate because it is not necessarily 
cheaper than medical malpractice insurance and because all physicians still 
have to insure against injuries that are not covered by the fund. This plan, and 
the cap on the tort system, seems to have stabilized medical malpractice 
insurance rates for birth injuries, but this was at a time when rates were 
generally stable in most states. 
The Florida plan is very different, primarily because it is not an exclusive 
remedy.99 In effect, the plan has a narrow definition of injury, which is also 
the extent of the preemption. 100 The plan includes a requirement that the 
plaintiff prove causation, and filing with the plan tolls the statute of 
94. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning, supra note 9 1 ,  at 1677. 
95. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW 
OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM, ii (Jan. 
2003), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/Rpt284.pdf. 
96. Id. at 48. 
97. Id. at 5. 
98. Id. at ii-iii. 
99. David M. Studdert et al. ,  The Jury Is Still In: Florida's Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499, 5 17  (2000). 
100. The injury must be ( 1 )  to the brain or spinal cord of a (2) live infant (3) weighing at least 
2,500 grams at birth. It must be (4) caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury 
and (5) occur in the course of labor, delivery, or resus-citation in the immediate 
postdelivery period (as opposed to genetic or congenital abnormality). The birth must take 
place (6) in a hospital. Finally, as a consequence of the injury, the infant must have been 
(7) rendered permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. 
Id. at 503. 
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY IA W JOURNAL [Vol. 49:73 
limitations. 101 If the plaintiff is turned down by the plan, the fact that the 
plaintiff does not have a covered injury means that the plaintiff s claim is also 
not pre-empted and the plaintiff can file a medical malpractice claim. 102 The 
result is that while the plan has been fairer for the participating plaintiffs, it has 
had little effect on the number of birth-injury claims filed in Florida. 103 
To the extent that these plans work, it is because they use standard criteria 
and an administrative review process. They are limited to a very narrow range 
of injuries but, within these limits, the Virginia plan seems to be fairer than the 
tort system for both patients and physicians. The Florida plan is good for 
patients but has only increased the compensation and medical malpractice 
costs because it is not an exclusive remedy. Virginia is a better model, but it is 
a reminder that equitable compensation for injuries is expensive. Neither plan 
addresses deterrence by requiring risk management strategies to prevent or 
reduce birth injuries. '04 
IV. THE ADVENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY CREDENTIALING 
Our proposal for an administrative compensation system for medical 
malpractice injuries assumes that the IOM, working through CMS at the 
federal level, will successfully implement a national medical quality 
credentialing system. While the IOM' s  proposed system does not assign fault 
in individual cases, it does assign fault based on the physician' s  aggregate 
behavior. The plan will be based on guidelines that are equivalent to legal 
findings of standard of care which can be used as the basis for administrative 
compensation.105 
Perhaps the most challenging hurdle to improving health quality and cost is 
the need for a methodology to objectively rank physicians. Certainly, no one 
wants an error-prone physician providing care to a family member. On the 
other hand, high quality physicians who rarely commit medical errors or have 
adverse outcomes need to be identified, not only to reward the physicians' 
good behavior, but also so we might all learn from these master healers. 
A. Traditional Method 
Currently, there are two crude methods of measuring medical outcomes. 
First, physicians have been rated by various consumer groups such as Public 
101 .  Id. 
102. Id. at 517-19. 
103. Id. at 504. 
1 04. It would have been an interesting experiment to have required the use of a structured 
prenatal care system as a condition of participation to find out if doing so could have reduced 
injuries. 
1 05. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law Approaches to Medical Malpractice Reform, 
49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45 (2004). 
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Citizen. 106 Consumer group rankings generally suffer because they are based 
on negative outcome, i.e.,  how often a physician has been sued or disciplined 
by a board of medical examiners. Such rating systems not only fail to identify 
quality providers but can also be misleading. Consumer group data is not 
normalized by the volume of patients a physician cares for in a given time 
period. Thus a physician with three claims in five years might be a part-time 
physician who has treated relatively few patients or a front-line physician in a 
major hospital's  trauma department treating several times as many patients. 
Consumer data also fails to account for the severity of the patient's underlying 
illness. A physician might have a high death rate because he or she is 
recognized in the community as the best hope for complicated patients and 
treats only the sickest patients. Conversely, a surgeon with a very low 
complication rate for a difficult procedure might be operating on people who 
are not sick enough to need the procedure and thus are much more likely to 
survive. 
B. Managed Care Method 
The second crude method of rating physicians is by economic 
credentialing. A widely used definition of economic credentialing is a system 
for ranking physicians "solely on economic factors which are unrelated to the 
individual 's  ability" as determined by peer review. 107 Basically, under this 
system, the least cost-efficient physicians are deemed to be of the lowest 
quality. Physicians eschew economic credentialing because it is conceptually 
possible to avoid having an adverse outcome if only they could do everything 
possible. Moreover, when hospitals engage in economic credentialing there 
are anti-kickback concerns. 108 Unfortunately, economic credentialing is hard 
to fight because the traditional alternative of peer review as the sole method for 
judging physicians does not work as an objective yard stick of physician 
quality. 109 
C. Patient Safety Method 
It was against this background that the IOM published To Err is Human. 1 10 
In this monograph the IOM called for the development of clinical practice 
guidelines. This clarion call has been recently taken up by the National 
I 06. See Public Citizen, Latest Public Citizen Publications, at http://www.citizen.org/ 
publications (last visited Nov. I ,  2004). 
1 07. American College of Medical Quality, Professional Policies, Policy 19: Economic 
Credentialing, at http://acmq.org/profess/policyl9.htm (last visited Nov. l ,  2004). 
1 08.  Paul Danello, Economic Credentialing: Where is it Going? (2003), available at 
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/files/00989/009358. 
1 09. Thomas R. McLean, Medical Rationing: The Implicit Result of Leadership by Example, 
36 J. HEALTH L. 325, 337 (2003). 
1 1 0. See generally To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 2 .  
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Quality Forum (NQF). l l1 More specifically, the NQF is recommending that 
the health-care industry adopt clinical practice guidelines that are being 
developed from scientific data collected by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Leapfrog Group to minimize iatrogenic 
injury.112 The power behind the NQF's recommendations comes from two 
sources. First, the NQF is a consensus organization whose membership spans 
1 13 f . d '  ' d  1 all facets of the health-care industry. Members vary rom m iv1 ua s 
concerned with improving health care to Fortune 500 companies. Because the 
NQF' s recommendations represent the consensus of its membership, it is 
reasonable to assume that the individual members will adopt these 
recommendations as their own. When a Fortune 500 company, or other large 
purchaser of health care, adopts the NQF's recommen dations, it is likely that 
these recommendations will be incorporated into the employer's health plans. 
This of course has an important implication: If a medical service is not 
provided in accordance with the NQF' s recommendations, it is possible that 
the medical service rendered will not be considered properly payable. 
The second power source behind the NQF' s recommen dations is an act 
that is little known in health-care circles: the National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTT AA).114 Enacted to facilitate information 
transfer in the electronic and telecommun ication industries, nothing prevents 
NIT AA from being utilized in the health-care industry. NTI AA directs 
government organizations that elect to develop objective standards to adopt, 
absent a compelling reason to the contrary, the objective standards of an 
industry if they are articulated by a "consensus organization."1 15 Although 
"consensus organizations" is a defined term, Dr. Ken Kizer, CEO of NQF, 
stated publicly that, not only does the NQF meet the definition of a consensus 
organization, but it was also specifically designed to exploit the power granted 
by NTTAA.116 Accordingly, if a governmental agency, such as CMS, is 
interested in adopting patient safety standards in health care, then the agency 
must consider NQF recommendations very strongly.11 7 
There is no question the government is going to adopt guidelines because 
the greatest impediment to controlling health-care cost is the autonomous 
1 1 1 . NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SAFE PRACTICES FOR BETTER HEALTH CARE, v (2003), 
available athttp://www.qualityforum.org/txsafeexecsumm+order6-8-03PUBLIC.pdf. 
1 1 2. Id. at v-vi. 
1 1 3 .  National Quality Forum, About the National Quality Forum, at 
http://www.qualityforum.org/about/home.htm. 
1 1 4.  Pub. L. No. 104- 1 1 3 ,  1 10 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000)). 
1 1 5. Pub. L. No. 104- 1 1 3  (codified as amended at 15  U.S .C. § 272 (1996)). 
1 1 6. Ken Kizer, Address at the Cerner Millennium Conference, Kansas City, Mo. (Sept. 1 1 ,  
200 1 ). 
1 1 7. Thomas R. McLean, Application of Administrative Law to Health Care Reform: The 
Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 16 J.L. & Health 65, 74 (2001-2002). 
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physician. 1 1 8  In a recent GAO report on medical inflation, the government 
observed that the American economy is about to break under the weight of this 
important economic force . 1 19 Accordingly, to tame medical inflation the GAO 
has called for a significant increase in individual provider-specific outcomes 
data.120 With such data, the GAO argues that cost-efficient providers should 
be rewarded and cost-inefficient providers encouraged "to emulate [the] best 
practices" of other providers. 121 The GAO goes on to add that individual 
providers, and especially physicians, need to have their practice pattern 
monitored, and where there is deviation from the best practice, the provider 
should be held accountable. 1 22 In this regard the GAO observes that it will be 
necessary to develop "an authoritative source of reference for the public, 
providers, and payers on what constitutes effective care."123 
In Leadership by Example the IOM encouraged the phasing in of 
guidelines for the fifteen diseases that account for eighty-five percent of 
health-care costs. 124 Guidelines will create a bright-line test to determine if a 
physician is delivering quality care. To illustrate, consider a guideline that 
states: If a ten-year-old child presents with a fever, a sore throat, and clinical 
findings consistent with a bacterial infection, the standard of care treatment is 
outpatient penicillin. 125 If a physician sees a ten year old with a sore throat, the 
physician can comply with the guideline and prescribe penicillin, or the 
physician can document a contra indication to penicillin and treat with another 
antibiotic. If the physician follows the guideline and prescribes penicillin, the 
IOM would consider this to be quality care. 126 If the physician does not 
1 1 8. McLean, supra note 8. 
1 1 9.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GA0-04-793SP, HEALTH CARE: 
UNSUSTAINABLE TRENDS NECESSITATE COMPREHENSIVE AND FuNDAMENTAL REFORMS TO 
CONTROL SPENDING AND IMPROVE v ALUE 25 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new .items/d04 793sp.pdf. 
1 20. Id. at 20. 
1 2 1 .  Id. at 1 2. 
1 22. Id. at 2 1 .  
1 23. Id. at 17-18.  
1 24. COMM. ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY PROGRAM, INST. OF MED., 
LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GoVERNMENT ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTH CARE 
QUALITY [hereinafter LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE]. See also McLean, supra note 1 17, at 7�7 1 .  
1 25 .  This would be standard treatment today; however, many physicians prescribe more 
expensive antibiotics. If a physician is asked why the more expensive antibiotic was prescribed, 
the standard answers are that it is as effective as penicillin and has fewer side effects. Assuming 
that the drug is as effective as penicillin, the reason the drug has few side effects is because the 
drug will be new to the market. Plus, if the physician does not prescribe this drug, they will never 
receive any more favors from the drug reps who are pushing the more expensive drugs. 
1 26. COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR PATIENT SAFETY, INST. OF MED., PATIENT SAFETY: 
ACHIEVING A NEW STANDARD FOR CARE 30 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
PATIENT SAFETY]. 
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comply, automated data analysis programs scanning the required electronic 
medical records will flag the record for further review. 127 
Non-compliance can result in two outcomes. First, if the non-compliant 
event was a significant deviation from the standard of care that potentially 
threatened injury to the patient, immediate remedial action would be set into 
place. 128 This might range from counseling to disciplinary action. 129 The 
reviewer might also determine that the physician properly documented a valid 
reason for the deviation and the case would be closed. Most deviations would 
not be acute threats to the patient, but, in the aggregate, they would constitute 
substandard care. For example, assume that a physician violated the guideline 
for treating sore throats in children statistically more frequently than 
comparable physicians, 130 the physician would then be offered an opportunity 
to explain the deviation. If the physician has not properly documented that his 
patient population justifies different treatment, the physician will be subject to 
remedial actions, including limitations on the physician's right to care for 
federally funded patients or to practice in facilities that care for those 
patients. 131 While not a finding of fault in an individual case, this will be a 
much more powerful deterrent than having the malpractice insurer pay a 
settlement or judgment, which does not affect the physician's ability to 
practice. 
D. Value-Based Purchasing: Putting Teeth into Clinical Guidelines 
In Leadership by Example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) encourages the 
federal government to use its unique purchasing power in the health-care sector 
to reform the system. 132 In particular, the IOM recommends that the 
government adopt "value-based purchasing." 133 Value-based purchasing 
rewards vendors who provide high-quality goods and services. 134 Value-based 
purchasing is characterized by: "(1) disclosure of comparative quality 
1 27. Robert A. Guyton, Quo Vadimus?, 78 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 39 1 ,  395 (2004). 
1 28. Even before the days of patient safety it was possible for a physician to order a drug in 
violation of a guideline and be immediately investigated. See Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., No. 
00-07 1 6-CY-W-HFS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1800, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2004). 
1 29 .  Prior to the establishment of patient safety guidelines it was possible to summarily 
suspend a physician's privileges. See Med. Staff of Sharp Mem'l Hosp. v. Superior Court of San 
Diego County, 121  Cal. App. 4th 173,  176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
1 30. While a detailed discussion of statistics is not within the scope of this paper, it is 
sufficient to say that when there is a statistically significant difference between two physicians, 
this difference is not due to chance alone; there must be a reason. 
1 3  l .  A similar analysis can be done for surgical outcomes that are not subject to clinical 
practice guidelines. If the surgeon has too many complications, the surgeon will have to explain 
why his or her patients do not fair as well. See generally McLean, supra note 8. 
1 32 .  LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE, supra note 124, at 6. 
1 33.  Id. at 67. 
1 34. Id. 
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information to encourage consumers and purchasers to choose the highest­
quality providers, and (2) selective purchasing or payment incentives to 
providers and beneficiaries." 135 According to the IOM, value-based 
purchasing would return the best price while c reating the right incentives for 
health-care providers to provide high-quality (i.e., error-free) medical 
services. ' -10 
Moving to value-based purchasing will mean that safety data that is 
provider-specific will need to be gathered. Safety data, as used here, is broadly 
defined to cover near misses as well as actual errors. 
A near miss is defined as an act of commission or omission that could have 
h armed the patient but did not do so as a result of chance (e.g., the patient 
received a contraindicated drug but did not experience an adverse drug 
reaction). prevention (e.g., a potentially lethal overdose was prescribed, but a 
nurse identified the error before administering the medication), or mitigation 
(e .g., a lethal drug was overdose was administered but discovered early and 
countered with an antidote). 1 37 
Even without harm being caused to a patient, a near miss will identify an event 
that may increase front-end cost (e.g., unnecessary testing) or back-end costs 
(e.g., litigation). Conversely, near misses may reveal methods to control cost 
on the front end (e.g. a more efficient way to care for patients) or the back end 
(e.g., a safer way to care for patients). It is hard to imagine a value-based 
purchasing system that would ignore this information. After all, the purpose of 
shifting health care to value-based purchasing is precisely to identify and 
reward good providers and weed out the bad providers. 
The threat of weeding out sub-quality providers will be a strong incentive 
for physicians to conform to objective standards of care. Physicians will not 
be able to accumulate errors and near misses. If they do, their employers will 
have to conclude that they are not physicians of quality. Moreover, in a 
rational world one would expect that once an employer has concluded that a 
physician is not of quality, that employer would not renew the physician ' s  
contract. 138 In short, in the near future physicians will be credentialed based on 
quality. Such credentialing will not be solely economic, nor will it be a 
resection of peer review. 
1 35. Id. 
1 36. Id. 
1 37. PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 126, at 30. 
1 38. Once quality credentialing is up and running, non-renewal of a physician's contract will 
be a fatal scarlet letter on the physician's resume. Non-renewal will signal that the physician 
inappropriately prescribes medical treatment at the very least and may signal a deeper flaw such 
as alcoholism or criminal propensity. In a world looking for quality physicians, non-renewal will 
be a red flag to future employers. 
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V. ELEMENTS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
Federal quality credentialing removes both the deterrence and punishment 
aspects of tort law, leaving only compensation to be addressed. 1 39 Federalizing 
the standards for medical quality review is critical because it removes the 
rationale for jury-determined standards of care. As happened in the federal 
pre-emption cases for medical devices, 140 a uniform federal standard for 
medical quality should pre-empt state tort law findings contrary to the federal 
standards. 141  The federalizing of standards is critical because only the federal 
government can impose a uniform national system of administrative 
compensation. No state is prepared to move to pure administrative 
compensation. 142 It is in the interest of the federal government to establish 
objective standards because it would be fairer to patients, which is consistent 
with the patient safety movement, and because it would eliminate the tension 
between federal practice guidelines and state tort efforts to undermine those 
guidelines, as has been seen with some state efforts to undermine private 
quality and cost controls. 143 The alternative is complete pre-emption of tort 
claims, as ERISA provides for health plans, which is far less fair than an 
administrative compensation system. 144 
An administrative system to deal with compensation does not need to be 
perfect, only better than the tort system. There are four important lessons to 
draw from the tort system as a method for compensation for medical 
negligence injuries. First, the only compensation is for serious injuries. 
Second, most of the dollars in the system go to lawyers and the medical 
malpractice insurer. Even the plaintiff s settlement seldom nets more than 
sixty percent of the settlement value, and, in many cases, less than fifty percent 
of the gross settlement. Third, because of state collateral source rules, medical 
care and other insured costs are often paid twice. Fourth, the randomnes s  in 
the tort system cuts both ways. Just as physicians sometimes lose claims that 
1 39. Because monetary awards, even big verdicts, are almost always settled within insurance 
limits for the physician, even a punitive damage award is not really a punishment. Limitations on 
medical practice, which can be imposed through quality credentialing, are a very real punishment. 
140. Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001);  Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 
F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001); Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57 ( 1 st Cir. 1982). 
1 4 1 .  Congress can give a federal agency the power to pre-empt state Jaw. See New York v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1 ,  18 (2002) ("[A] federal agency may pre-empt state 
law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority."). 
1 42. While trial lawyers are the visible opposition, such systems also threaten defense lawyers 
and the medical malpractice insurance industry. There is no push for administrative 
compensation by physicians because they fear the traditional problem of an explosion of claims if 
the system lowers the transaction costs. 
143. See generally Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (forcing a 
managed-care company to provide a medically unnecessary and costly procedure). 
144. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 1 24 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004). 
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are medically unfounded, patients also lose claims that are medically 
founded. 145 
B ut compensation does not have to work this way. The Virginia birth 
injury system shows that even a simple administrative compensation system 
will put more money in the hands of injured persons and less in transaction 
costs than the tort system. It demonstrates that by providing for flexible 
payments of future medical-care needs, the system assures long-term care, one 
of the biggest failures of the tort system. The Virginia system also takes 
advantage of other available insurance and only pays costs that are not 
otherwise insured. Implicit in the definition of a birth injury is the notion of a 
severe injury, which ensures that the system is not susceptible to swamping 
with low-level claims that would not be compensated under the tort system. 
While the Virginia birth injury compensation system provides u seful 
les sons, it cannot be generalized because of the narrowness of its coverage. 146 
A general compensation system could not have a listed set of compensable 
conditions because the potential variation is too large. The system will have to 
depend on expert review of claims. This is already done by medical review 
panels in several states, but these depend on the tort system to present the 
claims. A better parallel i s  the Social Security Disability system. 
A. The Social Security Disability Model 
A person making a claim for disability must fill out forms that show the 
person is not gainfully employed or making more than the allowable limits for 
a disabled person. 147 The claimant must also provide medical records and 
physician's  statements documenting the nature of the mental or physical 
condition that makes it i mpossible for the claimant to work. 148 These 
documents are reviewed by a disability examiner to determine if the claimant 
has a condition that has been legally determined to be disabling. 149 This list of 
conditions is  established by administrative regulation or by statute. 150 If the 
person ' s  condition is listed, then they are automatically determined to be 
1 45. While there is no good data on this, it is likely that patients lose more deserving cases 
than physicians lose undeserving cases. Because medical malpractice defense is usually done by 
experienced attorneys with adequate working budgets, physicians generally get good 
representation. Patients who have the bad luck of picking an inexperienced lawyer who does not 
refer the case to an expert lawyer will often lose meritorious claims. Even experienced lawyers 
want to maximize their return on the work invested and will often drop a case if it looks difficult 
to win, even if it is meritorious. 
1 46. There are other limitations associated with the Virginia and Florida birth compensation 
systems. First, both systems allow an injured party to have the option of using the tort system. 
Second, despite these systems being termed no-fault coverage, they are, like tort law, fault-based. 
1 47. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-36 ( 1976). 
1 48. See id. at 336. 
1 49. Id. at 335. 
1 50. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1983). 
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disabled. 151 If the condition does not fit a listed condition, then the examiner 
has a protocol to evaluate the claimant' s overall condition and job skills to 
determine if they are otherwise disabled. 152 
This review is done entirely on the written records submitted to the agency. 
If these records are insufficient, the agency can ask the person to submit to a 
physical evaluation by an independent physician, who will make a report to the 
agency to supplement the claimant' s records .153 If the claimant is turned down 
for benefits, he can require a hearing before an administrative law judge to 
contest the agency's findings. 154 This process was challenged as violating the 
claimant's right to due process because there was no right to a hearing before 
the initial agency determination. 155 The United States Supreme Court ruled 
that this process provided constitutionally adequate due process. 156 The Court 
found that the cost of a hearing on all claims before the initial determination 
was not cost effective because it would not result in significantly more 
accurate determinations. 157 The right to be heard after the determination of 
disability was sufficient. 158 
This same type of review could be done to determine whether a patient 
who received negligent care was injured by that c are, and, if so, how much the 
patient is entitled to for compensation. The system could use uniform 
standards for economic losses and use independent experts as necessary. Such 
a review would be more accurate and more efficient than a judicial 
determination. Unlike medical malpractice cases, in which standards are based 
on the persuasiveness of experts and not scientific validity, these 
administrative panels could publish their standards so that the process would 
be transparent. The compensation review should be kept separate from the 
quality credentialing process, at least to the extent that whether there was a 
compensation award should not be considered as part of quality credentialing. 
Quality decisions must be made on the health care rendered, not the vagaries of 
the patient' s reaction to the care. Conversely, quality credentialing 
information would be an important consideration in determining if the c are fell 
below the acceptable standard and was thus compensable. 
B. Controlling the Costs of Compensation 
The first limitation on the system should be the level of compensation. As 
with the Social Security Disability system, the claimant should have to show 
1 5 1 .  Id. at 460. 
1 52. Id. 
1 5 3 .  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 337. 
1 54. Id. at 339. 
1 55. See id. at 324-25. 
1 56. Id. at 349. 
1 57. Id. at 347. 
1 58. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. 
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significant injury, which could include large unpaid medical costs. The system 
should take into accoun t  all other insurance proceeds and social welfare 
programs and only pay otherwise uncompensated costs. The payments should 
be tailored to provide adequate income for ordinary wage earners, not highly 
paid workers. There should be no compensation for emotional injuries in 
themselves, but compensation should include any treatments that might 
ameliorate the injuries. Highly paid workers who want to assure they w ill 
receive full compensation for injures should be expected to purchase first-party 
insurance159 to cover employment income or business losses and disability . 1 60 
This shifts the burden of paying for extra protection to those who can best 
afford it and best determine the level of risk that they want to assume. 161 
B ecause the largest damage awards under such a system would be for 
medical care, especially future care for permanent injuries, as they are u nder 
the current tort system, broadening the reach of the medical insurance system 
would reduce the potential payouts. Under a single payor national health 
insurance system, 162 all medical care costs would be removed from the 
compensation system. More generally, by eliminating the collateral source 
rule, 163 a national health system would eliminate the major damages in all tort 
cases, not just those under an administrative compensation system. Ironically, 
universal access to medical care coupled with an elimination of the collateral 
source rule would eliminate the major damage engine in tort law.164 
C. Paying for the Costs of Compensation 
The fairest way to pay for compensation for medical negligence injuries 
under a working quality credentialing system would be as a tax on the proceeds 
of the health-care system. Rich surgeons would pay more than poor 
pediatricians, and rich specialty hospitals would pay more than community 
1 59. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 
69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 48 1 (2004). 
1 60. This might even be done on a per procedure basis, as is done with flight insurance. 
1 6 1 .  George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1 52 1 ,  1 550--61 (1987). But see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance 
Ext ernality: An Economic Just ification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1 990). 
1 62. See COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED., INSURING 
AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 3 1  (2004); David u. Himmelstein 
& Steffie Woolhandler, National Healt h Insurance or Incremental Reform: Aim High, or At Our 
Feet ?, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Jan. 1, 2003, at 102. 
1 63 .  This would be logical because the policy rationale for the rule is to encourage the 
purchase of insurance, which would no longer be relevant. 
1 64. This could have a profound effect on small auto accident cases and other cases where the 
major part of the recovery is usually based on the insurer paying at two to four times the cost of 
the medical care, which the attorney conspires to raise by working with friendly medical care 
providers who pile on unnecessary and sometimes dangerous care. 
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1 65 h.f . hospitals that served the poor. Even under the current system, s 1 tmg 
payment for compensation to a tax on profits would be much more fair than the 
current system, where good physicians underwrite bad physicians who often 
make much more money through their shoddy and dangerous practices. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the debate over tort versus administrative compensation for medical 
negligence injuries is not new, what is new is the development of a national 
quality credentialing system for physicians and hospitals. This system 
implicitly recognizes the failure of tort law to provide useful deterrence 
signals, especially when cost of care is also a consideration. 1
66 By providing 
an independent system for assuring quality medical care, the federal 
government must be concerned with state tort actions that will undermine the 
effectiveness of the national system, both by second-guessing the federal 
standards and by using them in unintended ways. Using the power of federal 
pre-emption to substitute an administrative compensation system would protect 
the federal standards for quality care. At the same time, it would redress the 
deep unfairness of the current tort system, which neither fairly compensates 
injured patients nor fairly allocates the cost of compensation across the health­
c are system. 
1 65. The federal government pays about forty percent no matter how the system is structured 
because the federal government buys about forty percent of the health care in the United States. 
Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in Federal 
Health Care law, 5 1  ALA. L. REV. 1 63, 171  (1999). 
1 66. It also recognizes the failure of state medical licensing boards to enforce even 
�dimentary quality standards, thus supporting the argument of tort lawyers that that tort system 
is the only check on poor-quality medical care. 
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different sources and the integration of this data into a general 
model of risk management intervention.10 
II.  THE ECONOMICS O F  RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management efforts must save more money than they 
cost if they are to be acceptable to business. It does not make eco­
nomic sense to spend $100 to prevent a risk whose occurrence will 
cost only ten dollars. 1 1  While it may be socially desirable to pre­
vent injuries to workers, a corporation would cheat its shareholders 
if it spent more to prevent injuries than it saved through those 
expenditures.12 In most situations it is cost-effective to prevent in­
juries, but this decision must be based on economic data, not on 
appeals to corporate paternalism. The old corporate controls based 
on government regulation have proven unacceptable, but corpora­
tions have begun to realize that the �tive of regulation 
through Jitigation can be much more cos#. than government regu­
lation.18 Thia new litigation · te de'8Dda that corporations 
quickly develop mechanisma to manage dab, lelt they face cata­
strophic losses from unanticipated litiga.n. 
There are three contributiona to the • of rilk takina behav­
ior. The first is the direct cost due to the OCCJUftllce of the risk. 
This includes the 1088 of skilled personnel, machine downtime, and 
other factors that reduce productivity, as well as the payment of 
compensation to the injured party. The second is the cost of the 
efforts to prevent or manage the risk before its occurrence. The 
gal System Can it Be Analyzed to Suit the Scientist?, in ScmHTlSTS IN THK l..sGAL YSTKM 
(W. Thomas ed. 1974). 
10. For a discussion of the importance of model building, see R. PouND, SOCIAL CON· 
TROL THROUGH LAW (1942). As Profe880r Pound stated: "Theories of what i1 have a marked 
effect upon ideas of what ought to be. Men tend to do what they think they are doing." Id. 
at 26. Another commentator has noted that "[t]he function of a general theory of law i1 not 
to discover the immediate sources of law, however important that may be in the atudy of a 
particular area, but to segregate the factors which operate in all areas in the creation, modi· 
fication, transformation and disappearance of legal a)'ltema." H. CADlNS, Tm Tu.BORY or 
LEGAL SClENCE 89 (1969). 
1 1 .  For an analysis of the economic basis of tort law and ita impact on risk taking, aee 
tevens, Medical Malpractice: Some /mplicatiom of Contract and Arbitration in HM0'1, 
59 Mil.BANK MEMORIAL FuND Q./HBALTH AND Socirrv, 59, 66 ( 1981). See allo C. TONK, 
WH.ERB Tm LAw ENDS, Tus Socw. C oNTROL or CoRPORATS BKHAvtoa 33 (1975). 
12. This is certainly true if the expenditures cauaed the corporation to 10 out of buai­
n 
· For a d iscussion of the merita of this view in leaa draatic circU1D.1tancee, aee C. STONE, 
supra note 1 1 , at 75. 
13. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prada. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 4 1 9  U.S. 869 ( 1974). 
